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at internalizing the e¤ect of each agents health on the spouses welfare. In
the presence of singles in the population, the optimal policy requires also
a di¤erentiated subsidization of health spending for singles and couples.
Finally, under imperfect observability of couples, the incentive compatibility
constraints reinforce the need for subsidization of health spendings.
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1 Introduction
A major challenge raised by the ageing of populations consists of the rising
demand for long-term care (LTC) services, i.e. services necessary for persons
who can no longer carry out daily activities such as eating, dressing, or bathing.
Actually, whatever the scenarios on future dependency rates are, the number
of dependents will grow in the next decades, making the LTC problem a major
issue for policy makers.1 To give an idea, the European Union (2009) forecasts
that the number of elderly dependents in the EU-27 will grow from 21 millions
in 2007 to more than 44 millions in 2060.2 Such an evolution will stimulate
the demand for LTC services, which may shift from informal care (provided by
family or friends) to formal care (either at home or in nursing homes).3
Figure 1: Men and women old age dependency
Besides its overall size, the LTC phenomenon involves also large gender dif-
ferentials: women are, on average, far more subject to old age dependency than
men are ceteris paribus.4 That gender di¤erential is illustrated, for France, by
Table 1, which is taken from Cambois et al (2008). French women have, at age
65, a life expectancy that is 4.5 years longer than the one of men. Moreover,
whatever the disability considered, women tend also to live longer without that
disability. However, the period of dependency is longer, on average, for women.
For instance, French women can expect, at age 65, to live about 3 years with
1See Duee et al (2005) on the sensitivity of forecasts to old-age dependency scenarios.
2Note that this forecast, which assumes a (quite pessimistic) constancy of age-specic de-
pendency rates, may tend to overestimate the size of the future number of dependents.
3According to the EU (2009), 2/3 of the LTC services are currently provided informally in
the EU-27, but that proportion is likely to shrink over time (see the EU for forecasts).
4Note that there exist other sources of old age dependency di¤erentials. See for instance
Pérès et al (2005) on the e¤ect of education di¤erentials on disability-free life expectancy.
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washing di¢ culties, against only 1.5 years for men. Thus, while women have a
longer life, these live also a longer period of dependency with LTC services.
Another important aspect of the LTC problem is the crucial role played by
the marital status. Actually, whether a person belongs to a couple or not matters
a lot for his health and survival prospects. For instance, Bouhia (2007) showed,
on the basis of French data, that men aged between 50 and 60 years who are
single face a mortality risk that is 40 % higher than the risk faced by men living
in couples. That extra risk amounts to 70 % for women. Hence, the study of
the LTC problem must take not only gender di¤erentials into account, but, also,
the e¤ect of the marital status on the old-age dependency and survival.
Undoubtedly, the existence of large di¤erentials across people according to
the gender and the marital status raises di¢ cult questions to policy-makers. The
dilemmas could be summarized as follows. Should a government, in the light of
those di¤erentials, subsidize mens health spending in such a way as to make
these live a longer autonomous life (like their wifes), or, on the contrary, should
governments subsidize womens health spending, in such a way as to reduce their
- longer - period of dependency, or both? Moreover, should governments treat
agents di¤erently, depending on whether they belong to a couple or not?
Although those questions become increasingly important for policy makers,
little attention has been paid to those issues so far, as these lie at the intersection
of two literatures that have not really merged so far.
On the one hand, recent articles in public economics have concentrated on
the tax treatment of couples. In particular, several studies examined whether
taxation systems should rely on joint or on individual taxation, in the cases
where couplesmembers have di¤erent earning capacities and di¤erent elasticities
of labour supply, in the presence or absence of household production (see Apps
and Rees, 1988, 1999, 2007, Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983, Cremer et al., 2007 and
Kleven et al., 2006). However, those studies did not consider the issue of long-
term care, and could thus not examine the optimal taxation of LTC spending for
agents who belong to a couple (or not), which is the topic of the present paper.
On the other hand, there exists also a large literature on the demand and
supply of LTC services (see Norton, 2000). Nevertheless, few papers consider the
design of the optimal taxation policy under endogenous LTC demand. The few
existing normative papers on LTC, such as Jousten et al (2005) and Pestieau and
Sato (2008), have taken the dependency status of the elderly as something that is
exogenously given, and, thus, could not discuss the optimal taxation of preventive
LTC spending, i.e. spending that reduce the likelihood of old-age dependency.
Moreover, those papers, which focused on the parent-child relationship, did not
pay a particular attention to gender di¤erentials among the elderly, and to the
impact of the marital status on agentshealth. For instance, Jousten et al (2005)
studied the optimal tax policy in an economy where households are composed
of one dependent parent and one child, under heterogeneity on the altruism of
children. More recently, Pestieau and Sato (2008) examined the optimal policy
in an economy where some elderly become dependent, and where young adults
di¤er in their productivity. Here again, the optimal policy was shown to depend
on the available taxation instruments, as well as on the informational constraints
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faced by governments, but there was no concern for heterogeneity among the
elderly (either in terms of life expectancy or in marital status).
The goal of this paper is precisely to study the optimal tax policy in an
economy where agents can inuence their future old-age autonomy, and where
agents di¤er in gender and marital status. More precisely, we consider an econ-
omy where agents can invest in preventive LTC spending, which can reduce the
probability of old-age dependency, but where survival and dependency prospects
are, ceteris paribus, varying with the gender and the marital status. As such, this
paper complements the normative literature on LTC by introducing two sources
of heterogeneity - the gender and the marital status - which, despite their impact
on survival and autonomy, have remained so far largely ignored.
For that purpose, we develop here a two-period model, where the population
is composed of two types of agents, i.e. men and women, whose di¤erent physio-
logical characteristics lead to di¤erentials in survival and autonomy prospects. In
that economy, men and women face an exogenous survival probability to the sec-
ond period (which is larger for women than for men), and can inuence, through
rst-period health spending, gender-specic probabilities to be autonomous at
the old age.5 For the conveniency of presentation, we will consider three versions
of that model, from the most simple to the most complicated.
In order to emphasize the consequences of gender-specic health, we focus,
in a rst stage, on a simplied economy, where all men and women are singles,
that is, an economy without welfare interdependencies. We describe the laissez-
faire equilibrium in that economy where the disability-free life expectancy is
endogenously determined by agents health investments. The social optimum
and its decentralization through a tax and transfer policy are also examined.
In a second stage, we focus on an economy where all agents live in couples,
and we introduce, at the level of agentspreferences, (1) a self-oriented concern
for coexistence with the spouse; (2) an altruistic concern for the welfare of the
spouse.6 In that framework, agents care not only about their own future survival
and health, but, also, about the coexistence with their partner at the old age.
As we shall see, that valuation of coexistence a¤ects the optimal policy, as it is
a source of externalities. The government should make agents take into account
the (partly ignored) e¤ect of their health investment on their partners welfare.
In a third stage, we consider a more general economy, where some, but not
all, agents live in couples. Even if it complexies the framework by adding two
types of agents, the introduction of singles does not a¤ect the optimum subsidiza-
tion of health spending. However, under imperfect observability of the marital
status, incentive compatibility constraints reinforce the need for subsidisation.
The optimal tax and transfer scheme also depends on the degree of altruism of
individuals and on partition of the population into couples and singles.
Finally, it should be stressed that we will make, in the rest of this paper,
the following assumptions, which allow us to focus on the specicities raised
5Since we focus here on LTC, the assumption of exogenous (gender-specic) longevity
prospects is made for conveniency. Naturally, longevity is probably as endogenous as old age
dependancy. See Leroux et al (2008) on optimal policy under endogenous longevity.
6For simplicity, we focus here only on heterosexual couples.
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by the two sources of heterogeneity under study. First, agents are standard
expected utility maximizers.7 Second, individual temporal utility, which is state-
dependent, is the same for men and women.8 Third, the government is, for the
sake of simplicity, a classical utilitarian government.9
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model with singles only, characterizes the laissez-faire, the social optimum, and
its decentralization. Section 3 presents an economy composed of couples only,
and shows how coexistence concerns a¤ect the optimal tax policy. Section 4
considers an economy where some persons form a couple, while others are single.
Numerical simulations are carried out in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 Assumptions
Let us consider a population composed of two types of agents: men and women,
indexed byM and F . All agents are endowed with an equal amount of resources
w, and live as singles. Agents live, at most, two periods of life (of lengths
normalized to one): the rst period of life is lived for sure, while agents enjoy a
second period of life with a probability of survival i, for i =M;F .10
Following the large literature on longevity di¤erentials across genders (see
Vallin, 2002), we assume that
M < F
that is, mens life expectancy, equal to 1 + M , is smaller than womens life
expectancy, equal to 1 + F .
Elderly agents who survived to the second period face a gender-specic risk of
being autonomous, denoted by pi, for i =M;F: That probability of autonomy at
the old age (conditional on survival) depends on health spending in rst period
pi  pi(mi)
where mi is the amount of his private health spending. We assume, as usual,
p0i(mi) > 0 and p
00
i (mi) < 0 8i:
Following demographic work on gender-specic probabilities, we assume that
women face a higher age-specic probability of dependency11
pM (mM ) = p (mM )
pF (mF ) = "p (mF )
with "  1.
7See Leroux and Ponthiere (2009) for an alternative modeling of health-a¤ecting choices.
8However, that assumption does not prevent di¤erent health investments across genders, as
di¤erent survival prospects are here formally equivalent to di¤erent degrees of impatience.
9On the limitations of utilitarianism under unequal longevities, see Bommier et al (2009).
10Note that in Section 4, the survival probability will be di¤erentiated by marital status.
11On age-specic dependency rates for men and women, see Duee et al (2005).
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While women face a higher dependency rate at a given age, these exhibit a
higher disability free life expectancy, so that we assume that
1 + MpM (m)  1 + F pF (m)
That assumption is equivalent to having M  F ".
Apart from these longevity and health di¤erences, men and women are, for
simplicity, assumed to be identical on all other aspects. In particular, men and
women have here the same productivity, w, and the same preferences.
Regarding the specication of preferences, agents are assumed to be expected
utility maximizers. As usual, lifetime welfare takes an additive form, but we
assume nonetheless that temporal utility is state-dependent: the function u(:)
denotes the utility of consumption under autonomy (i.e. good health), whereas
the function v(:) denotes the utility of consumption under dependency (i.e. bad
health).12 In the rest of the paper, we will assume that v (:) = u (:)  L, where
L represents a utility loss due to old age dependency.13
Assuming a zero interest rate and no pure rate of time preference, the ex-
pected lifetime utility of an agent of type i =M;F can be written as14
Ui = u (ci) + i [pi (mi)u (di) + (1  pi (mi)) v (di)] (1)
where ci, di are the consumptions in the rst and the second periods respectively.
First-period and second-period budget constraints are
ci  w  mi   si
di  Risi
For simplicity, we assume that individual savings si are invested in a perfect
annuity market yielding actuarially fair returns (for di¤erent risk classes), so
that Ri = 1=i.
2.2 Laissez-faire
An agent of type i =M;F solves the following problem
maxu (w  mi   si) + i [pi (mi)u (Risi) + (1  pi (mi)) v (Risi)]
First order conditions with respect to si and mi are, respectively,
iRi

pi (mi)u
0 (di) + (1  pi (mi)) v0 (di)

= u0 (ci)
ip
0
i (mi) [u (di)  v (di)] = u0 (ci)
Under our assumption of a perfect annuity market (iRi = 1) and replacing for
the expression of v (:), we obtain
u0 (ci) = u0 (di)
p0i (mi) =
u0 (ci)
iL
12As usual, we postulate u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0 and v0(c) > 0, v00(c) < 0:
13This is done for simplicity, but other assumptions would not strongly a¤ect our results.
14Note, however, that the survival probability to the second period serves here as a natural
discount factor.
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Thus, consumptions are smoothed across time, for all agents.
We now compare the laissez-faire allocations of men and women. The above
condition can be rewritten as
p0 (mF ) =
1
"
u0 (cF )
FL
p0 (mM ) =
u0 (cM )
ML
Since men and women have the same productivity, they end up with the same
lifetime income,
w = cF (1 + F ) +mF = cM (1 + M ) +mM
Using those three conditions and pFF > pMM (equivalently F " > M), we
can show that the only possible solution consists in cF < cM and mM 7 mF .
Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Provided the market for gender-specic annuities is actuarially
fair, the laissez-faire allocation is such that
(i) cF = dF < cM = dM ,
(ii) mM 7 mF .
Thus, at the laissez-faire, women consume less than men in both periods.
However, it is not obvious to see whether women spend more or less on their
health than men. The reason behind that indeterminacy comes from the exis-
tence of two e¤ects. First, women have smaller consumption in the second period,
which reduces the incentive to invest in LTC. But, second, women face better
survival prospects, which motivates more health investment ceteris paribus. The
indeterminacy follows from those two opposite e¤ects.
2.3 Social optimum and decentralization
Let us now consider the problem of a utilitarian planner, who chooses consump-
tions and health spending to maximize social welfare,
max
ci, mi, di
i=F;Mni fu (ci) + i [pi (mi)u (di) + (1  pi (mi)) v (di)]g
s.to W   i=F;Mni fci +mi + idig  0
where ni is the proportion of agents of type i = M;F in the population, while
W = i=F;Mniw is the total endowment of the economy. Under v (:) = u (:) L,
the FOCs can be written as
u0 (ci) = u0 (di)
p0 (mF ) =
1
"
u0 (c)
FL
p0 (mM ) =
u0 (c)
ML
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Thus, consumption is smoothed across times and individuals, cF = dF = cM =
dM = c. Using pFF > pMM , we also now have mF > mM . Thus, at the social
optimum, more resources should be spent on the health of women, as these enjoy,
for an equal level of health spending, a higher disability free life expectancy than
men, that is, a longer healthy life. In comparison with the laissez-faire, the
indeterminacy does not hold here, as consumptions are equalized across agents,
so that it is here more protable to invest in womens health (as F > M ).
It is straightforward to show that this social optimum can be decentralised
through lump sum tranfers only, so as to equalise consumptions between indi-
viduals. These net transfers, TF and TM are such that
TF = (1 + F ) c+mF   w > TM = (1 + M ) c+mM   w
Hence, the decentralization of this social optimum involves the transfer of re-
sources from men to women. Our results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The rst-best allocation yields:
(i) cF = dF = cM = dM = c,
(ii) mF > mM .
Thus, if we assume a single source of heterogeneity - gender-specic survival
and old-age dependency - the utilitarian optimum involves a redistribution of
resources from men to women, as the latter, by having a better physiology,
are a more direct way to raise social welfare.15 Note, however, that such a
conclusion is premature, as the above analysis ignores an important aspect of
the problem: in reality, men and women live generally in couples, so that welfare
interdependencies exist. How would these a¤ect the optimal policy?
3 An economy of couples
To answer that question, this section studies an economy where all agents live in
couples, and where no one stays single. For simplicity, all couples are assumed
to be composed of a man and a women. In that economy, agents care not only
about their survival and health, but, also, about the ones of the spouse.
3.1 The spouses utility function
In an economy of couples, individual preferences can hardly be represented by
utility functions as simple as the ones used in the previous section. Members
of a couple have the specicity to care, in one form or in another, about their
partner. The term "care" is quite general, and, as such, may lead to ambiguities,
in the sense that there exist various ways to "care" about the partner. In our
economy, each agent is assumed to care about his partner in two distinct ways.
First, an agent cares now not only about his own survival and health status
(as above), but, also, about the survival and health status of his or her partner.
15This is a consequence of utilitarianism, which, under additive lifetime utility, redistributes
from short-lived to long-lived agents.
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That concern is self-oriented or egoistic: the husband would like his wife to
survive and be healthy if he survives, but this has nothing to do with the welfare
(either consumption or health) of his wife. In other words, partners care about
the survival and health of their spouse just to avoid loneliness or care-provision.
Second, an agent cares also about what his or her partner feels, that is about
her welfare. This constitutes another form of concern, which is distinct from the
previous one, as this involves what is usually referred to as "pure" altruism. A
major distinction with respect to the previous concern is that, in the present
case, the interest of the agent in his or her partner is not conditional on his /
her own survival, contrary to what prevailed under the rst motive.16
Let us see how those two distinct forms of concerns for the partner can be in-
troduced within our model. To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume
that agents are, as above, expected utility maximizers. Moreover, for simplicity,
individual utility in each state is additive with respect to the self-oriented co-
existence concern and the altruistic concern. Under those assumptions, agents
face a lottery, whose form is illustrated on Figure 2, for the case of men. That
lottery includes 9 distinct scenarios: in the case where both the husband and the
wife survive, there are four possible scenarios in terms of old-age dependency;
in each case where only one member of the couple becomes old, there are 2 dis-
tinct scenarios in terms of old-age dependency; nally, in the case where no one
reaches the old-age, there is a unique scenario, as old-age dependency does not
matter in that case. This makes a total of 4 + (2 x 2) + 1 = 9 outcomes.
Figure 2 presents the utility assigned to each outcome by men. The parameter
aMF denotes the (self-oriented) utility gain, for the man, from coexisting with
a healthy wife (whatever he is autonomous or not); bMF denotes the utility
gain, for the man, from coexisting with a dependent wife; aFM and bFM are
the corresponding utility gains for women. Alternatively, the parameter M
captures the extent to which a husband is sensitive to his wifes welfare.17
Throughout this paper, we assume that each agent prefers, from a purely
egoistic perspective, to coexist with a healthy person than with an unhealthy
person, and prefers coexistence with an unhealthy person to loneliness. Hence
0 < bMF < aMF
0 < bFM < aFM
Those parameters are assumed to be independent from the agents own health.18
16However, agents altruistic concern for the other concentrates here on the private (i.e. self-
centered) part of his welfare. Alternatively, taking the whole welfare into account would yield
a recursive welfare. Given that this more complex modeling would not yield additional insights
for the issue at stake, we will focus here on the simple altruistic form proposed above.
17Note that, if the man was purely self-oriented, we would have M equal to zero, and, as a
consequence, the husband would be totally indi¤erent between the last three branches of the
tree, where he did not survive the rst period. Indeed, if there is no altruism, then in case of
death the man does not care about the survival and/or health status of his wife at the old age,
so that the number of relevant scenarios is reduced to 6.
18This modelling of agentsconcerns for coexistence is made for the sake of analytical conve-
niency. It is likely that, in reality, the welfare gain, for an agent, from coexisting with a healthy
rather than an unhealthy partner (e.g. for men: aMF   bMF ) may depend on whether he is
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pF Good health: UcM =u(cM)+u(dM)+aMF
                                                                                                                                                                + ?M [u(cF)+u(dF)+aFM]
Wife
survives
  ?F
1 - pF
Dependent: UcM =u(cM)+u(dM)+bMF
           Good  + ?M [u(cF)+v(dF)+aFM]
Health
                              pM 1 - ?F Wife dies: UcM =u(cM)+u(dM)+?M u(cF)
Survives pF Good health: UcM =u(cM)+v(dM)+aMF
                                                             + ?M[u(cF)+u(dF)+bFM]
Wife
1 - pM ?F survives
Dependent 1 - pF
?M Dependent: UcM =u(cM)+v(dM)+bMF
                                                  + ?M [u(cF)+v(dF)+bFM]
. Man 1 -??F
Wife dies: UcM =u(cM)+v(dM)+?M u(cF)
   1 - ?M
                                                                                                 Good health: UcM = u(cM)+?M[u(cF)+u(dF)]
                                                                              pF
                                                                  Wife
?F survives
                                Dies
              1 - pF
                                                                                                 Dependent: UcM = u(cM)+?M[u(cF)+v(dF)]
                                          1-??F
                                                                Wife dies: UcM = u(cM)+?M u(cF)
Figure 2: Mens lottery under selsh coexistence concerns and altruism
Moreover, no particular restriction is imposed on the altruistic parameters
M and F , except that these are non-negative, and less than unity:
0  M  1
0  F  1
The parameter i 2 [0; 1] 8i =M;F can be interpreted as the degree of altruism
of an agent i belonging to a couple. The idea behind that restriction is that
members of a couple care positively about the welfare of the other (i.e. non-
negativity of i), but do not give more weight to the welfare of their partner
than to their own welfare (i.e. i  1). In the most extreme case, they behave
as an "ideal couple" (i.e. M = F = 1), in which decisions coincide with what
a unique person would decide.19 But in general, we will observe M < 1 and
F < 1, that, is, an imperfect internalization, by the agents, of the impact of
their decisions on the others welfare.
Under expected utility hypothesis and additive temporal utility in coexistence
and altruistic concerns, the preferences of a man belonging to a couple can, after
simplications, be represented by the following utility function,
U cM (cM ; dM ;mM ) = UM + MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M
+M [UF + FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F ] (2)
himself dependent or autonomous. Taking that di¤erence into account would demultiply the
number of parameters of interest, and this is why do not take that di¤erence into account here.
19That special case is an occurence of a perfect harmony, where each member of the couple
treats the other as he would treat himself.
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where UM , UF are dened by (1). The superscript c in U cM stands for couple
concerns. In order to simplify notations, we redene the net benet for a woman
of having an autonomous husband as F  aFM   bFM and the net benet for
a man of having an autonomous wife as M  aMF   bMF .
Hence, the utility function of a man belonging to a couple is the sum of four
terms. The rst term is the utility of a single individual, as in the previous
section. The second part corresponds to the welfare from coexisting with his
wife, i.e. MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M , where MF bMF represents the pure
utility from coexistence, independently from the health status of the wife (the
product MF being the expected coexistence time at the old age).20 The third
term represents the welfare gain, for the husband, from coexisting with a healthy
wife (whatever he is himself healthy or not). That expression depends on the
expected coexistence time with a healthy wife at the old age - i.e. MF pF (mF )
- and on the utility gain associated to the autonomy of the wife, i.e. M . Finally,
the last term in (2) accounts for the fact that the utility of a man belonging to
a couple depends also on the utility of his wife. Given that this depends on the
probability of the husband to be autonomous, the latter is going to take this into
account when choosing his health spendings, mM . The extent to which he takes
it into account depends on the value of M .21
Similarly, for women, the expected lifetime utility becomes here:
U cF (cF ; dF ;mF ) = UF + FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F
+F [UM + MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M ] (3)
In this extended model, the mans utility is, because of coexistence, a function
of the womans probability of autonomy pF (mF ), while the womans utility is
a function of the mans probability of autonomy p(mM ). Hence, except in the
case where the health status of the coexistent does not matter (i.e. i = 0 for
i = F;M), we are in presence of some externalities. Under i < 1, that is, under
an imperfect couple, agents, when choosing how much to spend on health, tend
to underestimate the externality their health status creates on the welfare of their
partner. Hence, under a decentralized decision of individual health investments,
the laissez-faire is likely to be suboptimal.22
3.2 Laissez-faire
Let us now solve the laissez-faire equilibrium. Note that even if agents form a
couple, their preferred bundle is not, under i 6= 1, equivalent to the one obtained
from the maximisation of a couples utility under a single budget constraint
(this will rather correspond to the rst-best equilibrium). We consider here a
20On the measurement and evolution of joint life expectancies over time, see Ponthiere (2007).
21For instance, if M = 1, the man perfectly estimates the impact of his health spending on
the welfare of his spouse, while if M = 0, he does not see this e¤ect at all.
22Of course, coexistence would not be a source of externalities in the case of a perfect couple
(i.e. M = F = 1). In that case, individual decisions coincide with the ones taken by a unique
decision maker, and all variables would be chosen in such a way as to maximize households
welfare (no intracouple externality).
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couple who would fully behave non-cooperatively. Quoting DAspremont and
Dos Santos Ferreira (2009), the type of couple we consider here is one that acts
as an independant management system in which each spouse keeps his / her
own income separate and has the responsability for di¤erent items of household
expenditure.
For a man, the problem consists in choosing consumptions and health spend-
ing so as to maximize (2) ;
U cM (cM ; dM ;mM ;mF ) = u (cM ) + M [pM (mM )u (dM ) + (1  pM (mM )) v (dM )]
+MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M
+M [UF + FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F ]
subject to the resource constraints
cM  w  mM   sM
dM  RMsM
Rearranging rst-order conditions yields
u0 (cM ) = u0 (dM )
p0 (mM ) =
u0 (cM )
ML+ MFMF
In comparison to Section 2.2, the second term in the denominator of the condition
on mM has to do with mans altruism. The higher the altruistic concern is (i.e.
the higher M is), the higher the health investment is ceteris paribus. Note,
however, that the strength of that term depends not only on the welfare assigned
by woman to the mans health, F , but, also, on the expected future coexistence
time, FM . Indeed, it is only to the extent that the wife survives and, of course,
that the husband survives, that the mans health decision matters for the women.
As for women, the problem is to maximise (3) subject to
cF  w  mF   sF
dF  RF sF
and obtain
u0 (cF ) = u0 (dF )
p0 (mF ) =
1
"
u0 (cF )
FL+ FMFM
Those conditions are symmetric to the ones describing the husbands decisions.
Finally, note that the conditions characterizing mM and mF di¤er from the
ones in the basic framework (see section 2.2), by a term MFij . This is due
to the fact that an individual belonging to a couple now cares for the welfare
of his partner, which itself depends on his probability of being in good health
(through the utility obtained from coexistence). If i < 1, the individual partly
internalizes this e¤ect of his health expenditure on the welfare of his/her partner.
As we shall see in the next section, depending on the magnitude of i, this
positive externality may not be completely internalised by the individual, so
that the laissez-faire can be ine¢ cient. Our results are summarized below.
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Proposition 3 Under coexistence and altruistic concerns, the laissez-faire allo-
cation is such that:
(i) ci = di 8i 2M;F ,
(ii) mi is increasing in the altruistic parameter i, and in the self-oriented
coexistence gain of the spouse j, for i; j 2M;F:
Note that it cannot be said a priori whether women tend to invest more or
less in their health than men, as this depends on various preferences parameters
of both women and men.
3.3 First-best
Let us now consider the problem of a utilitarian social planner under the new
specication of individualsutility. As this is well-known in the LTC literature
(see Jousten et al, 2005), the existence of altruistic concerns raises some di¢ cul-
ties, as it is not straightforward to see how altruistic concerns should be taken
into account by the social planner. Actually, various possibilities exist.
First, one can assume that the social welfare function should rely on the
actual altruistic coe¢ cients, i.e. M and F , whatever these are equal or not,
and whatever the consequences are.
Second, one could assume that the social planner should not take altruistic
concerns into account, and should x all altruistic coe¢ cients i equal to zero
when denining the objective function. Such a position can be defended on
the grounds that altruistic preferences should be regarded as irrelevant for the
distribution of income (see Hammond, 1987).
A third position consists in claiming that altruistic concerns should be taken
into account by the social planner, but not in their existing, imperfect forms,
but, rather, under an ideal form, i.e.  should be xed to 1. The underlying
idea is that the planner should do as if couples were idealcouples, in which
each member would be able to anticipate perfectly the impact of his actions on
the welfare of his spouse.23
Throughout this section, we will not adhere to the rst position, as it seems
unfair to make the social optimum dependent on the actual altruistic parameters.
It is indeed hard to see why more altruistic persons should be favoured for their
altruism, by receiving more resources. However, we will not choose here between
the second and the third solutions. We will, on the contrary, impose i =  in the
planners objective function. Depending on whether one adheres to the second
or the third position, one will be free to x  = 0 or  = 1.
Thus the problem of the social planner is now
maxnMU
c
M (cM ; dM ;mM ;mF ) + nFU
c
F (cF ; dF ;mF ;mM )
s.to W   nM fcM +mM + MdMg   nF fcF +mF + FdF g  0
23One can justify the planners attitude through "old" or "new" paternalism. Old paternalism
would amount to say that, by xing i = 1, the social planner expresses his view that individ-
uals, because they are part of a couple, should treat their partner exactly like themselves. New
paternalism, on the contrary, would regard i < 1 as a kind of interpersonal myopia (rather
than intertemporal myopia as usual). Agents would behave according to i < 1, but would
regret their choices later on, as they truly care for the others.
13
where we posit M = F =  in U cM and U
c
F . In such a case, we show that,
under  6= M ; F , the laissez-faire equilibrium is not optimal.
By assumption, in a society where there are only couples, we have nM =
nF = n. In the Appendix, we show that FOCs can be rearranged as
u0 (cM ) = u0 (dM ) = u0 (cF ) = u0 (dF ) =

(1 + )
(4)
p0 (mM ) =
u0 (c)
ML+ FMF
(5)
p0 (mF ) =
1
"
u0 (c)
FL+ MFM
(6)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint.
As in the initial rst-best, consumptions should be equalized across agents
and periods, cF = cM = dM = dF = c. On the opposite, whether mM 7 mF
now depends on whether F 7 M . If the extra net benet the man gets
from coexistence with a healthy partner is larger than the one of the woman
(i.e. M > F ), then mF > mM with no ambiguity. The social planner
encourages more health expenditures of the woman, both because she creates
a higher positive externality on her husband and because she is more likely to
survive (so that it is more protable to invest on her autonomy). On the contrary,
if M << F (i.e. the benet for a woman of having an autonomous husband is
much bigger than the benet for a man of having an autonomous wife), it might
be the case that mF < mM .24
The social optimum involves higher health spendings than under the laissez-
faire. This is related to the non-internalized (self-oriented) coexistence concerns.
In the laissez-faire, agents underinvest in their health, as they internalize only
imperfectly the e¤ect of their decisions on the others (self-oriented) welfare.
Moreover, the extent of underinvestment in health depends not only on how i
di¤ers from 1 (i.e. full internalization), but, also, on the joint life expectancy
of the couple, and on the size of the coexistence benet for the spouse (i.e. the
magnitude of the externality). Our results are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 At the rst-best optimum, we have, whatever  is:
(i) cF = cM = dM = dF = c,
(ii) mM 7 mF ,
(iii) provided i < 1, we have mi > mLFi , 8i = F;M:
Note that, in comparison with the laissez-faire, we have a higher level of
health spending at the rst-best, whatever we x  to 0 or 1. This somewhat
surprising result comes from the fact that, at the rst-best, counting each men
or women once or twice does not matter, as long as all members of couples are
counted in the same way, which is the case under either  = 0 or 1. To put it
di¤erently, the externality does not depend on whether the social planner xes
24This is so because the husband creates, in that case, a very large positive externality on
the woman (as she really enjoys living with a healthy partner); this counterbalances the fact
that he has a smaller survival probability than her.
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the altruistic weight  to 0 or 1, as this is related to the egoistic part of ones
welfare. Hence it should not be surprising that the level of  does not matter
for the extent of underinvestment in health.
3.4 Decentralisation of the rst-best
We now study how to decentralise the above optimum through a tax-and-transfer
scheme. In the following, we assume that instruments available for the social
planner are a tax on savings,  i, on health expenditures, i, and a lump sum
transfer, Ti. We still assume that the annuity market is actuarially fair so that
Ri = 1=i at equilibrium. The problem of a man is then:
max
sM , mM
U cM = UM + MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M
+M [UF ++FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F ]
s.to

cM  w  mM (1 + M )  sM (1 + M ) + TM
dM  RMsM
First order conditions are
u0 (dM )
u0 (cM )
= 1 + M (7)
p0 (mM ) =
u0 (cM )
ML+ MFMF
(1 + M ) (8)
Using the same procedure, we obtain similar rst order conditions for women,
u0 (dF )
u0 (cF )
= 1 + F (9)
p0 (mF ) =
1
"
u0 (cF )
FL+ FMFM
(1 + F ) (10)
Comparing these equations with the ones of the rst-best (4, 5, 6), we get the
following result.
Proposition 5 In an economy made of couples only, implementing the rst-best
optimum only requires taxes on health,
M =
  (1  M )
1 + L=FF
< 0
F =
  (1  F )
1 + L=MM
< 0
and lump-sum transfers TF and TM :
Note that, here, we do not need to tax savings, F = M = 0 and that
the direction of transfers depends on M and F . If M > F , TF > TM ;
otherwise it is ambiguous.
Men and womens health spending should be subsidized, as they create a
positive externality on each other, through individual self-oriented concern for
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coexistence. The subsidy on health spending i depends on the form of coexis-
tence concerns, i.e. on j , and on the degree of altruism, i. If, for instance,
the man (resp. the woman) perfectly internalizes his (her) inuence on his
spouse welfare, that is, if M = 1 (resp. F = 1), no subsidy is required and
M = 0 (resp. F = 0). In that case, agents act exactly as the ideal couple, and
equally care about their welfare and the one of their partner. The decentralisa-
tion requires only lump sum transfers (to operate redistribution between men
and women).
If, on the contrary, i < 18i, distortionary taxation is necessary and i < 0
depends on j . To understand this, assume now that 0 < M = F < 1, so that
both members of the couple equally underestimate their inuence on the others
welfare. If F  M , we obtain that jM j  jF j. In this case, health spending
of the man should be more subsidized, rst, because the woman is more likely
to benet from a autonomous husband (F > M ) and second, because the
net benet she obtains from him being autonomous is higher.25 Otherwise, we
may have jM j 7 jF j. If, for instance, the benet the woman gets from having
her husband autonomous is much lower than the benet the husband gets from
having his wife autonomous, i.e. F << M , one may have jM j < jF j.
4 An economy with singles and couples
Whereas Section 3 assumed that all men and women care about the coexistence
with their partner, this modelling was a simplication of reality, as some men and
some women are actually single. A more realistic description of reality should
involve men and women organized in couples or not, that is, a society where
some agents have coexistence concerns, while others have not. However, whether
men and women are single or not is not neutral as far as health is concerned. As
shown by Bouhia (2007), men aged between 50 and 60 years who are single face
a mortality risk that is 40 % higher than the risk faced by men living in couples.
That extra risk amounts to 70 % for women.26
To do justice to those concerns, let us now assume that the society is consti-
tuted of both single individuals and married ones, denoted by the superscripts
s for singles and c for couples. For simplicity, the structure of the society is
here taken as xed by individuals (no possibility of divorce) and by the social
planner.27 We have nsM and n
s
F the numbers of men and women who are single,
and ncM = n
c
F = n
c the number of couples.
Following demographic studies, we now assume:
sM < 
c
M
sF < 
c
F
25Having M < F reinforces the gap between jM j and jF j.
26 It should be stressed, however, that the mortality di¤erentials between singles and couples
tend to vanish as the age goes up. Moreover, agents who never lived in couples are an exception,
in the sense that these face a lower mortality risk at high ages.
27This constitutes a strong simplication of the problem.
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This means that single persons are, ceteris paribus, characterized by lower
survival prospects than married persons. This specication captures the fact that
merely coexisting with a partner reduces the negative consequences of accidents
(e.g. call for an ambulance), and promotes also a healthy way of life.28
4.1 First-best
4.1.1 Centralised solution
Provided he takes the family structure as xed, the social planner solves the
following problem:
max nc [U cM (c
c
M ; d
c
M ;m
c
M ;m
c
F ) + U
c
F (c
c
F ; d
c
F ;m
c
F ;m
c
M )]
+nsMUM (c
s
M ; d
s
M ;m
s
M ) + n
s
FUF (c
s
F ; d
s
F ;m
s
F ) (A)
s.to
W   nsM fcsM +msM + sMdsMg   nsF fcsF +msF + sFdsF g
 nc fccM +mcM + cMdcM + ccF +mcF + cFdcF g  0
where lifetime utilities U ci are dened by (3) and (2), where we substituted for
cM and 
c
F and Ui are dened by (1) where we substituted for 
s
i .
As in Section 3, we assume that M = F =  in U cM and U
c
F , because
there is no consensus on the altruistic parameters that should be used by the
social planner. As we already mentioned, assuming that M = F =  = 1
accounts for the fact that the social planner would like to model an ideal couple,
in which each member treats his partner exactly like himself. In that sense,
public intervention is justied to allocate resources as if we had an ideal couple,
in which each member had the same bargaining power. This solution can be
obtained by xing  to 1. However, such a modelling has here a serious drawback,
as it penalizes singles. Clearly, there is, in the objective function of the social
planner, something like a double-counting of a couples members as compared
to single individuals. Given that agents are not necessarily responsible for being
single, this double-counting of spouses may not seem fair. Thus, to avoid this,
one could assume M = F =  = 0. We will compare those two social optima
in this section. As we shall see, this does not change our results on the optimal
health spending, but it will have consequences on the optimal consumptions.
28Because we did not nd any evidence that the marital status also inuences the probability
of autonomy, we keep, for simplicity, our initial formulations for pM (:) and pF (:), and do not
make them depend on the marital status.
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The rst-order conditions of the social planners problem are:29
u0 (ccM ) = u
0 (ccF ) = u
0 (dcM ) = u
0 (dcF ) =

(1 + )
= u0 (cc) (11)
u0 (csM ) = u
0 (csF ) = u
0 (dsM ) = u
0 (dsF ) =  = u
0 (cs) (12)
p0 (mcM ) =
u0 (cc)
cML+ 
c
F
c
MF
(13)
p0 (mcF ) =
1
"
u0 (cc)
cFL+ 
c
M
c
FM
(14)
p0 (msM ) =
u0 (cs)
sML
(15)
p0 (msF ) =
1
"
u0 (cs)
sFL
(16)
As above, consumptions are still equalized across periods and between women
and men of the same group (i.e. single or couple). However, consumption may
be here di¤erent for individuals with di¤erent marital status, depending on the
value of the parameter . If, for instance  = 0, consumption is smoothed
between groups, and all individuals obtain the same level of consumption: cc =
cs. However, if  equals 1, consumption levels in all periods are larger for a
member of a couple than for a single individual: cc > cs. This is due to the fact
that the consumption of a member of a couple creates a positive externality on
the welfare of the other member of the couple, so that the planner wants to favor
it, through higher consumption levels.
Health expenditures are now di¤erentiated not only with respect to gender,
but, also, with respect to the marital status. As before, we have msM < m
s
F
and mcM < m
c
F for reasonable di¤erences between F and M . Additionally,
health spending of agents who belong to a couple should now be higher than
the ones devoted to singles, that is, msF < m
c
F and m
s
M < m
c
M .
30 This is the
result of the positive externality they create on their partner. This e¤ect is also
reinforced by the fact that members of a couple have, ceteris paribus, a higher
life expectancy than single individuals, so that they are more likely to benet
from these health investments. It is thus optimal to put more resources on them,
so as to increase the probability of the good health scenario in the future. Those
results are independant of the value of i, since it does not enter explicitly into
equations (14) to (16). Our results are summarized in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 The rst-best optimum is such that:
(i) consumption is smoothed across periods and between individuals with the
29See Appendix B for calculations.
30Assuming a probability of autonomy that depends on the marital status would only modify
the size of (mcM  msM ). In this case, if the probability of autonomy is smaller (resp. greater)
for singles than for couples (for the same level of m), this would decrease (resp. increase)
msM relative to m
c
M and thus, increase (resp. decrease) the gap between health expenditure of
singles and of couples.
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same marital status,
cc = ccM = d
c
M = c
c
F = d
c
F
and cs = csM = d
s
M = c
s
F = d
s
F .
and if  = 0, cc = cs, while if  > 0, cc > cs,
(ii) health spending are lower for men than for women miM < m
i
F 8i = s; c, and
for singles than for couples, msi < m
c
i 8i = F;M .
To sum up, playing with the value of  has consequences on consumptions
only. Note that, a priori, there is no obvious reason for preferring  = 1 over  =
0. Yet, as shown below, this choice has consequences on the size of redistribution
from single to couples.
4.1.2 Decentralised solution
As before, we assume that the optimum can be decentralised using the following
instruments, which may be di¤erentiated by gender, i = F;M and by marital
status, j = s; c: a tax on savings,  ji , a tax on health spendings, 
j
i and lump
sum transfers, T ji . Proposition 7 shows our results.
31
Proposition 7 In a society where there are couples and singles, the decentrali-
sation of the rst-best optimum only requires to subsidize coupleshealth expen-
diture:
 cM = 
c
F = 
s
M = 
s
F = 0 (17)
sM = 
s
F = 0 (18)
cM =
  (1  M )
1 + L=cFF
< 0 (19)
cF =
  (1  F )
1 + L=cMM
< 0 (20)
Lump sum transfers from men to women and from singles to couples are also
necessary:
T iM < T
i
F 8i = s; c
T sj < T
c
j 8j = F;M
As in Section 3, there is no tax on the savings and on the health expenditures
of single agents, since they do not create any externality. However, there is a
subsidy on coupless health spendings, in order to internalize the (self-oriented)
coexistence externality. As in Section 2, ci depends on how much the agent
in a couple cares for his partner, i, on the coexistence benet the individual
creates on his partner if autonomous, j and on the probability of his partner
to e¤ectively enjoy this benet, cj .
31See the Appendix for the calculations.
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To see these e¤ects, assume rst that i = 18i, so that the utility function
of agent i corresponds to the one taken by the planner. In this case, no tax or
subsidy on health is required, as individuals perfectly internalize their impact
on partnerswelfare. Only lump sum transfers are needed. Let us now assume
that partners equally care about the welfare of others, i.e. M = F , and that
the coexistence benets are equal, i.e. F = M . In this case, the subsidy on
the mans health spending is higher, because cF > 
c
M , that is, the probability
that the woman actually benets from the coexistence (with an autonomous
partner) externality is higher. This e¤ect is amplied if the benet from healthy
coexistence is larger for the woman than for the man, i.e. if F > M .
Regarding the direction of transfers, we obtain that the rst-best optimum
is achieved by means of lump sum transfers from men to women (independently
from their marital status) and from singles to couples, as we have:
T jM = c
j (1+)jM +m
j
M   w < T jF = cj (1+)jF +mjF   w 8j = s; c,
and T si = c
s (1+)si +m
s
i   w < T ci = cc (1+)ci +mci   w 8i =M;F .
Note that T cM < T
c
F holds for reasonable di¤erence between F and M while
for other categories, no condition is required. If the planner considers that  = 0,
we have cs = cc, while if  = 1, we have cs < cc. Hence, transfers should be
higher if  = 1 than if  = 0, because consumptions are also di¤erentiated
according to the marital status.
4.2 Asymmetric information
In this section, we assume that the social planner cannot observe with certainty
whether individuals belong to a couple or whether they are single.32 In the
previous subsection, we showed that the health spendings of a couple are al-
ways larger than the ones of a single, msi < m
c
i 8i = M;F and that if  = 1
(or 0), consumptions of a couple should be also larger than for a single (resp.
equal). Thus, if the social planner cannot observe the marital status of agents
and proposes the rst-best bundles, single individuals have always interest in
claiming to be part of a couple, even though they have no coexistence concerns
and do not care about the welfare of a partner. In such a case, we may actually
expect false couples to be declared, just to benet from higher health spendings
(and consumption levels), which would be a social waste in the absence of real
coexistence concerns. In this subsection, we account for that asymmetry of in-
formation and design an allocation, which prevents any type from pretending to
be of the other type.
The second-best problem of the social planner corresponds to problem (A),
to which we add two incentive constraints:
UM (c
s
M ; d
s
M ;m
s
M )  UM (ccM ; dcM ;mcM )
UF (c
s
F ; d
s
F ;m
s
F )  UF (ccF ; dcF ;mcF )
32 It seems logical to assume that the social planner can always observe the gender.
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These two constraints simply require that single individuals (either men or
women) are always better-o¤ with their singles bundle than with the bundle of
a couples member.
Depending on the ability of the government to double-check the marital sta-
tus of its citizens (i.e. for the husband and the wife) or not, and on the ability
of agents to play cooperatively or not when reporting their marital situation,
four cases can arise. These cases are summarized in the table below, where
F and M denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the two incentive
compatibility constraints.
Agents Governement
single check double check
Play non-cooperatively M > 0; F > 0
M > 0; F = 0
or M = 0; F > 0
Play cooperatively M > 0; F > 0 M > 0; F > 0
If the government can only single check (because, for instance, of atomicity)
and if agents do not play cooperatively (no transfers are possible), then none of
the two incentive constraint is redundant, as a single person can always pretend
to be married, and lie on its own (given the absence of double-check). If the gov-
ernment can double-check, and if agents play non-cooperatively, then one incen-
tive constraint becomes redundant.33 If the government can only single-check,
but agents play cooperatively, then the two incentive constraints are needed:
otherwise, if only one is binding, monetary transfers from one person to another
could induce the formation of a false couple. The same would be true even if the
government can double-check.
In the rest of this subsection, we abstract from the special case where the
government can double-check the marital status of citizens, and where agents
cannot play cooperatively. As a consequence, we shall have F > 0 and M > 0.
In the Appendix, we solve the problem and show that rst order conditions can
33Note that, in an economy where the government could double-check the marital status of
its citizens, it would not be possible for a man to lie without a women lying too.
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be rearranged as
u0 (dsM )
u0
 
csM
 = 1 (21)
u0 (dsF )
u0
 
csF
 = 1 (22)
p0 (msM ) =
u0 (csM )
sML
(23)
p0 (msF ) =
u0 (csF )
"sFL
(24)
u0 (dcM )
u0
 
ccM
 = 1  M(1+)nc
1  MsM(1+)nccM
(25)
u0 (dcF )
u0
 
ccF
 = 1  F(1+)nc
1  F sF(1+)nccF
(26)
p0 (mcM ) =
u0 (ccM )

1  M(1+)nc

cML

1  MsM(1+)nccM

+ cF
c
MF
(27)
p0 (mcF ) =
1
"
u0 (ccF )

1  F(1+)ncF

cFL

1  F sF(1+)nccF

+ cF
c
MM
(28)
As before, we assume that the altruism parameter  can be either 0 or 1 and
compare the implications these assumptions have.
We nd no distortion at the top, i.e. single individuals face the same trade-
o¤s as in the rst-best. Consumption should be smoothed across time for single
men and women. However, in the second best, there is no reason for consumption
to be equalised between single men and women: this is due to the introduction
of the two incentive constraints. This also implies that we cannot tell whether
msM 7 msF .
As for the couples, consumption trade-o¤s are now distorted downwards and
we nd that dcM > c
c
M and d
c
F > c
c
F . In comparison to the second best, the social
planner encourages second-period consumption for agents belonging to a couple,
as a way to discourage singles from mimicking them. Indeed, if a single agent
pretended to be in couple, he would obtain too high a level of second-period
consumption given his survival probability (we have that sM < 
c
M ).
Note that this reasoning applies also to health expenditures. As compared
to the rst-best trade-o¤, the right hand sides of (27) and (28) are smaller, so
that health spending are encouraged for men and women living in a couple (i.e.
mc;FBi < m
c;SB
i 8i). As before, the social planner provides more health spending
to those individuals as a way to discourage singles from pretending to belong to
a couple. For them, it is not worth investing that much in health, as they face
a lower probability to survive in the second period than agents in couples (and
this would be to the detriment of their rst-period consumption).
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Finally, the second-best distortion for couples is greater when  = 1 than
when  = 0.34 This is linked to the introduction of the incentive constraint: if
 = 1, the utility of a true member of couple is counted twice in the objective
function, while the utility of single individual pretending to belong to a couple is
only counted once in the incentive constraint.35 Thus, the double counting e¤ect
mentioned earlier now appears also through the incentive constraint. Thus, in
(25) and (26), the gap between two-period consumptions of a couple is smaller
when  = 1 than when  = 0 (as u (:) is increasing and concave). Similarly,
in (27) and (28), the level of health spending is smaller ceteris paribus if  = 1
than if  = 0.
Finally, we study how to decentralise the second-best. In the Appendix, we
derive the optimal second-best levels of  ji and 
j
i , with i = M;F denoting the
gender and j = c; s denoting the marital status.
Proposition 8 Under asymmetric information, the decentralisation of the op-
timum requires only to subsidize couplessavings and health expenditure:
 sM = 
s
F = 
s
M = 
s
F = 0
 cM =
1  M(1+)nc
1  MM(1+)nccM
  1 < 0
 cF =
1  F(1+)nc
1  F F(1+)nccF
  1 < 0
cM =
(L+ M
c
FF )

1  M(1+)nc

L

1  MM(1+)nccM

+ cFF
  1 < 0
cF =
(L+ cF
c
MM )

1  F(1+)ncF

L

1  F F(1+)nccF

+ cMM
  1 < 0
As in the rst-best, single individuals (independantly of their gender) are
not taxed. On the contrary, individuals living in couple now face a subsidy on
second-period consumption, so as to solve the incentive problem. Regarding the
subsidy on health expenditure, its level is higher than in the rst-best as there
are now two e¤ects playing in the same direction. First, this subsidy aims at
internalizing the positive coexistence externality and second, it is used as a way
to prevent singles from mimicking couples. The subsidies (either on savings or
on health expenditure) also depend on the parameter  chosen by the social
planner, through the incentive term. If  = 1, the subsidy tends to be smaller
than if  = 0, ceteris paribus.36 Note that lump sum transfers depending on the
gender and on the marital status are also likely to take place. However, their
34To see this, compare the right hand sides of expressions (25)  (28) when  = 1 and when
 = 0. These expressions are bigger in the former than in the latter case.
35 If  = 0, we obtain the usual distortion factor, 1  M=nc.
36As we show in the numerical section, susbsidies can be smaller if  = 0. This reverse result
is obtained because the is are also modied.
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direction is ambiguous (since we can only imperfectly rank consumptions and
health spendings across individuals).
5 A numerical illustration
5.1 Calibration
Let us now illustrate our ndings by means of some numerical simulations. For
that purpose, we shall assume that temporal welfare takes a simple CES form:
u(ci) =
c1 i
1  
where  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (here equal
to the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion).37 We assume  = 0:83 as a benchmark
case (see Blundell et al, 1994).
The old-age dependency for men and women is modelled by means of func-
tions that are increasing and concave in health spending:
pM (mM ) =
AmM
1 +AmM
pF (mF ) = "
AmF
1 +AmF
where A is a positive constant.
In order to calibrate the parameters A and ", we need to consider the data
on life expectancies and healthy life expectancies for men and women. On the
basis of Table 1 for France, and assuming an initial age of 25 years and a length
of period of 40 years, we have a life expectancy for men at age 65 equal to
M = 17:1=40 = 0:4275 period, and a life expectancy at age 65 for women equal
to F = 21:5=40 = 0:5375 period.
Healthy life expectancy at age 65 for men is MpM = 15:5=40 = 0:3875,
while for women it is F pF = 18:8=40 = 0:47. Therefore, under M = 0:4275
and F = 0:5375, we have pM = 0:906 and pF = 0:874. Hence, assuming that
health spendings are equal for men and women, we have
" =
pF
pM
=
0:874
0:906
= 0:965 < 1
On the basis of this, we calibrate the A parameter as follows. If health
spending represent about 10 % of the endowment per person, as this is the case
in countries such as France or Germany (see OECD, 2009), it follows that, if the
total endowment W equals 20, and W=2 equals 10, health spending should be
approximately equal to 1. Hence,
0:906 =
A
1 +A
() A = 9:638
37Given that agents do not a¤ect their longevity, it makes sense assume u(0) = 0.
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The calibration of the utility loss associated with old age dependency, L, re-
lies on subjective satisfaction studies on the dissatisfaction burden due to old-age
dependency. Actually, the loss L can be interpreted as the absolute welfare loss
due to dependency, and, thus, as the di¤erence between a healthy and an un-
healthy elderly person ceteris paribus. The empirical literature gives us estimates
of the relative contribution of dependency to satisfaction.
Various empirical studies on the welfare costs of disability show that the rel-
ative loss is far from insignicant (see Ferrer-i-Carbonnell and Van Praag, 2002;
Lucas, 2007). In this paper, we shall rely on the evidence given by Oswald and
Powdthavee (2007) on the basis of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
Oswald and Powdthavee show that the life satisfaction of the chronically disabled
is about 20-25 % smaller than the one of the never disabled, and that this gap is
robust across the years considered.38 Note that the translation of respondents
answers in terms of preference parameters depends on whether their answers
reect their entire welfare, or only the private part of it (i.e. satisfaction about
the private partof my life). To keep things simple, we assume that answers on
satisfaction are not inuenced by coexistence concerns or altruism. Under that
hypothesis, the relative contribution of dependency to satisfaction at the old age
is equal to  L=u(ci). Thus, if we take an average value of 22.5 %, we have
 L=u(ci) = 0:225. Hence, if rst period consumption is approximately equal to
6 in the laissez-faire (which is conrmed by the simulations), it follows that the
old-age dependency welfare loss L is equal to 0:225 u(6) = 1:79.
Regarding the calibration of the coe¢ cients of concerns for coexistence, we
can rely on a recent study by Braakmann (2009), who estimated, on the basis of
the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-2006, the instensity of the welfare
losses associated to the disability of a spouse. He showed that the size of welfare
losses due to spousal disability vary strongly with the degree of disability, but can
amount to between 1/4 and 1/2 of the welfare loss caused by ones own disability.
On the basis of this, we shall assume that the welfare loss due to spousal disability
is, in the benchmark case, equal to 1/3 of ones own loss in case of disability. Here
again, the translation of answers in terms of preference parameters depends on
whether the loss is due to a self-oriented disappointment, or to a true altruistic
concern for the other. Here again, we assume that agentsanswers concern the
private part of their welfare, and do not depend on the coe¢ cients i. Thus,
if the loss amounts to about 1/3 of ones own loss due to dependency, we have:
i = (1=3)L. Note, however, that Braakmanns study suggests that women are
far more sensitive to the spouses disability than men are, so that, we shall also,
in a second stage, consider the case where M = (1=4)L < F = (1=2)L.
Finally, we need, to be able to characterize the optimal policy in the pres-
ence of singles and couples, to calibrate two features of the economy: rst, the
proportions of singles and couples in the population; second, the overmortality
associated to living alone. For each of those parameters, we will rely on the
recent study by Bouhia (2007) for France.
Bouhia (2007) shows that, if we concentrate on men and women of ages
38That gap is quite stable over the period 1996-2002: the never disabled exhibit a satisfaction
score of about 5.3 (on a 1 to 7 scale), against only 4.2 for the always disabled.
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between 60 and 70 years (approximately the population at the end of the rst
period of our model), about 81 per cent of men live in a couple, against 19 per
cent alone. For women, about 68 per cent of women live in a couple, against
32 per cent alone. Hence, if we normalize the entire population to unity, and if
we consider only, for simplicity, heterosexual couples of persons within the same
age group (so that the number of men living in a couple must be equal to the
number of women living in a couple), we obtain the following proportions:
ncF = n
c
M = 0:37; n
s
F = 0:17; n
s
M = 0:09
As far as overmortality for singles is concerned, Bouhia shows that single men
between ages 60 and 70 exhibit a mortality rate of 20/1000, against 12/1000 for
those who live in a couple. Moreover, single women between ages 60 and 70
exhibit a mortality rate of 7/1000, against 5/1000 for those in couples. From
this, we have:
1  sM = 1:66 (1  cM )
sM = 
c
M   0:66 (1  cM )
and
1  sF = 1:40 (1  cF )
sF = 
c
F   0:40 (1  cF )
Remind that M = 0:4275 and F = 0:5375. We have that
0:4275 = (0:81)cM + (0:19)
s
M
0:5375 = (0:68)cF + (0:32)
s
F
Hence
0:4275 = (0:81)cM + (0:19) [
c
M   0:66 (1  cM )]
0:5375 = (0:68)cF + (0:32) [
c
F   0:40 (1  cF )]
From which we deduce that
cM = 0:4913;
s
M = 0:1556;
c
F = 0:5900;
s
F = 0:4260
5.2 Results
Having set up the parameters of the model, we now give the values of the taxes
and subsidies in a society where there exist couples and single individuals (i.e.
Section 4), both under symmetric (FB) and asymmetric information (SB).
The rst table below refers to the baseline case. It shows the optimal tax
and transfer policy under the assumption of equal coexistence concerns for men
and women (i.e. i = (1=3)L) and no altruism (i.e. i =  = 0). So as to
take into account the di¤erent inuences of the parameters, specically of the
proportions (ncF ; n
c
M ; n
s
F ; n
s
M ) and of the survival probabilities (di¤erentiated by
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marital status and gender), we proceed by steps. The rst part of that table
presents the results when survival probabilities are only di¤erentiated by gender
(but not by marital status) and assuming that couples represent half of the
population, while single male and female represent one fourth respectively. In
the second part, we keep the previous proportions, but we assume that survival
chances depend on the marital status. In the last part, we relax the assumption
of equal proportions.
same coexistence benets  cM 
c
F 
c
M 
c
F
cM = 
s
M , 
c
F = 
s
F FB -0.1519 -0.1247
ncF = n
c
M
= nsF = n
s
M = 0:25
SB 0 0 -0.1521 -0.1249
cM > 
s
M , 
c
F > 
s
F FB -0.1643 -0.1407
ncF = n
c
M
= nsF = n
s
M = 0:25
SB -0.0044 -0.0011 -0.1683 -0.1420
cM > 
s
M , 
c
F > 
s
F FB -0.1643 -0.1407
ncF = n
c
M = 0:37;
nsF = 0:17; n
s
M = 0:09
SB -0.0017 -0.0007 -0.1659 -0.1415
Table 1: Taxes under same coexistence benets and no altruism.
Those gures illustrate the results we obtain in the analytical part.39 In the
rst-best, only the health spendings of couples should be subsidized, in order to
account for the positive externality that each spouse creates on the other. Note,
however, that the subsidy should be gender-specic: the subsidy on mens health
spending should be larger than the one on womens health spending. The reason
why this is so has to do with the larger life expectancy of women, which makes
the externality created by mens health expenditures larger than the one caused
by womens health spending.
As shown by the second part of the table, the subsidy on health spending
is increasing with the survival probabilities of the husband and of the wife.
Indeed, it is more e¢ cient to subsidize health spending, which have an impact in
the second period, when the survival probability to this second period is higher.
Not surprisingly, the proportions of each category in the society do not matter
in a rst-best (note that they disappear from the rst-order conditions).
In a second-best framework, single individuals are neither taxed nor subsi-
dized. This is the usual result that the mimickers allocation should not be dis-
torted. As for couples, not only their health expenditures should be subsidized,
but their savings too. The subsidy on health is now higher, as the incentive
motive reinforces the e¢ ciency motive of subsidizing health care. If survival
prospects are the same for couples and singles, taxes on savings should be zero
and only subsidies on health spending are required in order to prevent singles
from mimicking couples. If, on the contrary, survival probabilities are di¤erent
39We checked that si = 
s
i = 0, like in the theoretical part.
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between couples and singles, savings of couples should now be subsidized. Fi-
nally, when we assume di¤erent proportions for couples and singles in the society
(here, the number of couple increases and the number of single decreases), we
still nd that couples should face a subsidy on savings and on health spendings.
In the rest of the section, we study how the taxes and subsidies vary with
the coexistence benets and the degree of altruism. To this purpose, we now
keep the assumptions cM > 
s
M , 
c
F > 
s
F (as estimated previously) and n
c
F =
ncM = 0:37, n
s
F = 0:17; n
s
M = 0:09. We proceed by steps: in Table 2, we keep
the assumption of the same coexistence benets between wives and husbands
(F = M = (1=3)L), but we introduce a strictly positive (but equal across
individuals) degree of altruism, F = M = 1=2. In Table 3, we assume that
coexistence benets are still the same between individuals, but that the degree of
altruism is now higher for women than for men, F = 0:6 > M = 0:4. Finally,
in the last table, we relax the assumption of equal coexistence benets so that
F = (1=2)L > M = (1=4)L. Under asymmetric information, we provide
results under the assumptions of, successively,  = 0 and  = 1.40
F = M ; F = M = 1=2 
c
M 
c
F 
c
M 
c
F
FB -0.0822 -0.0704
SB  = 0 -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0839 -0.0713
 = 1 -0.0720 -0.0517 -0.1529 -0.1348
Table 2: Taxes under same coexistence benets and altruism.
First, comparing the values for health subsidies in Table 2 with the two last
lines of Table 1, we nd that their levels are smaller. This is due to the fact
that here, the couple partially internalises the fact that his decisions will have
an impact on the welfare of the other members of the couple (i 6= 0), while in
Table 1, there was no internalisation at all (i = 0).
Moreover, we nd, under our assumptions, that the subsidy on savings and
health expenditure should be higher under  = 1 than under  = 0, which may
appear to be in contradiction with our theoretical model. This is due to the fact
that when  = 1, the lagrange multipliers (both M and F ) are larger than
under  = 0, which explains the results that we obtain here (and that we could
not infer in the theoretical part).
In Table 3, we now di¤erentiate the degree of altruism between men and
women. As compared to Table 2, it increases for the woman while it decreases for
the man. Equivalently, the former internalises more the impacts of her decisions
while the latter internalises them less than in the previous case where F =
M = 1=2. As a consequence, in comparison with Table 2, the subsidy on health
should now be higher for men and smaller for women, both in the rst- and in
the second-best. Finally, since the taxation of savings is only required so as to
satisfy the incentive problem, in which the is do not intervene (see expressions
of  cM and 
c
F in Proposition 9), this is straightforward to nd that 
c
M and 
c
F
are equal in Tables 2 and 3.
40This di¤erentiation has no impact in the rst best.
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F = M ; F > M 
c
M 
c
F 
c
M 
c
F
FB -0.0986 -0.0563
SB  = 0 -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.1004 -0.0572
 = 1 -0.0720 -0.0517 -0.1681 -0.1217
Table 3: Taxes under same coexistence benets and di¤erentiated altruism.
Finally in Table 4, we introduce the di¤erence in coexistence benets between
men and women.
F > M , F > M  cM 
c
F 
c
M 
c
F
FB -0.1367 -0.0438
SB  = 0 -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.1385 -0.0446
 = 1 -0.0721 -0.0517 -0.2050 -0.1063
Table 4: Taxes under di¤erentiated coexistence benets and altruism.
Not surprisingly, the introduction of unequal coexistence concerns a¤ects the
optimal policy signicantly. Here, women value coexistence with healthy men
to a larger extent than men do value coexistence with healthy women. This has
the corollary to reinforce the level of the subsidy on mens health spending, and
to reduce the one of womens health spending.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that, in a society where men and women live either
as singles or in couples, preventive LTC spendings should be subsidized, to an
extent that depends on the gender and the marital status. The reasons for this
di¤erentiated subsidization of preventive LTC spending are the following.
When investing in their health (so as to increase their own probability of
being autonomous at the old age), spouses do not fully take into account that
they have an external e¤ect on the welfare of their husband/wife, who indirectly
benets from having a healthy partner. That externality, which does not exist
in a society of singles, justies some subsidization of health spending. The
size of that externality does not seem to be constant across genders, so that
a di¤erentiated treatment seems required. Indeed, in the light of Braakmanns
study (2009), women are more a¤ected than men by their spouses health status,
so that a larger subsidy on mens health spending seems required.
Moreover, under asymmetric information, single individuals would have an
interest in claiming to be in a relationship with another agent, in such a way as to
benet from a subsidy. In this case, it is optimal to subsidize both health expen-
ditures and savings of married men and women, in order to prevent singles from
claiming to be part of a couple. Hence the introduction of imperfect observation
of couples and singles reinforces the need to subsidize health spending.
In sum, this paper highlights that, under simple, but realistic, assumptions
about agentswelfare, the optimal taxation policy must involve a subsidization
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of preventive LTC spending that is di¤erentiated across gender and marital sta-
tus, and whose form depends on the structure of welfare interdependencies in
the population. Note, however, that this study relied on some simplifying as-
sumptions. Here are some of the major assumptions.
Firstly, we concentrated here on preventive LTC health spending only and did
not consider curative LTC spending. However, including curative LTC spending
in the framework may a¤ect the optimal subsidization of preventive spending.41
Secondly, we assumed that individuals, when they belong to a couple, care about
the existence and health status of their partner, but make their decisions on the
basis of their individual utility functions, rather than on the basis of alternative
functions, such as a household utility function reecting the bargaining power
of family members. Thirdly, we also assume that men and women have the
same productivities, whereas it could be argued that their endowment depends
on the health investment. More generally, assuming larger endowments for men
(like in reality) may a¤ect our results. Fourthly, we account for the utility
implications of coexistence, but not for their implications in terms of ressources,
while coexistence may enable to avoid some LTC expenditures. Finally, our
study relies entirely on a classical utilitarian framework. In the present context,
this involves redistribution from short-lived to long-lived agents and from singles
to couples. Obviously, other social objective functions should also be considered.
This is left for future work.
In the light of those limitations, much work remains to be done, in the future,
to characterize the optimal taxation policy in the presence of old-age dependency.
Given the size of the LTC problem, developing that research agenda seems ur-
gent, to be able to help the policy-makers who are facing a real demographic
and societal challenge.
41For instance, subsidizing preventive expenditure might be, under some conditions, a way for
the government to rely more on private assistance (inside the couple) than on public assistance.
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Appendix
A First-best in a society with only couples
The Lagrangian is
$ (cM ; cF ; dF ; dM ;mM ;mF ) = nM

UM + MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M
+ [UF ++FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F ]

+nF

UF + FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F
+ [UM + MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M ]

+ [W   nM fcM +mM + MdMg   nF fcF +mF + FdF g]
which is, given nM = nF = n, simply equal to
$ (cM ; cF ; dF ; dM ;mM ;mF ) = n (1 + )

UM + MF bMF + MF pF (mF )M
+UF + FMbFM + FMpM (mM )F

+ [W   n fcM +mM + MdM + cF +mF + FdF g]
First-order conditions are
u0 (cF ) =

(1 + )
u0 (cM ) =

(1 + )
pM (mM )u
0 (dM ) + (1  pM (mM )) v0 (dM ) = 
(1 + )
pF (mF )u
0 (dF ) + (1  pF (mF )) v0 (dF ) = 
(1 + )
Mp
0
M (mM ) [u (dM )  v (dM )] + FMp0M (mM )F =

(1 + )
F p
0
F (mF ) [u (dF )  v (dF )] + MF p0F (mF )M =

(1 + )
Rearranging these conditions and using the assumptions that v (:) = u (:)   L,
we obtain (4), (5) and (6).
B A society with singles and couples
B.1 First-best
Replacing for the functional forms of the utility functions, U cM ,U
c
F , UM and UF ,
with the adequate survival probabilities depending on the gender and on the
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marital status, the Lagrangian of problem (A) is written as
$ (ccM ; c
c
F ; d
c
M ; d
c
F ;m
c
M ;m
c
F ; c
s
M ; c
s
F ; d
s
M ; d
s
F ;m
s
M ;m
s
F )
= nc

UM + 
c
M
c
F bMF + 
c
M
c
F pF (mF )M
+ (UF ++
c
F
c
MbFM + 
c
F
c
MpM (mM )F )

+nc

UF ++
c
F
c
MbFM + 
c
F
c
MpM (mM )F
+ (UM + 
c
M
c
F bMF + 
c
M
c
F pF (mF )M )

+nsM [u (c
s
M ) + 
s
M [pM (m
s
M )u (d
s
M ) + (1  pM (msM )) v (dsM )]]
+nsF [u (c
s
F ) + 
s
F [pF (m
s
F )u (d
s
F ) + (1  pF (msF )) v (dsF )]]
+

W   nsM fcsM +msM + sMdsMg   nsF fcsF +msF + sFdsF g
 nc fccM +mcM + cMdcM + ccF +mcF + cFdcF g

Simplifying the objective function, we obtain
$ (ccM ; c
c
F ; d
c
M ; d
c
F ;m
c
M ;m
c
F ; c
s
M ; c
s
F ; d
s
M ; d
s
F ;m
s
M ;m
s
F )
= nc (1 + )

UM + 
c
M
c
F bMF + 
c
M
c
F pF (mF )M
+UF ++
c
F
c
MbFM + 
c
F
c
MpM (mM )F

+nsM [u (c
s
M ) + 
s
M [pM (m
s
M )u (d
s
M ) + (1  pM (msM )) v (dsM )]]
+nsF [u (c
s
F ) + 
s
F [pF (m
s
F )u (d
s
F ) + (1  pF (msF )) v (dsF )]]
+

W   nsM fcsM +msM + sMdsMg   nsF fcsF +msF + sFdsF g
 nc fccM +mcM + cMdcM + ccF +mcF + cFdcF g

Replacing for the functional forms of Ui (in which we include the modied
survival probabilities, cF and 
c
M ), rst-order conditions are
u0 (ccM ) = u
0 (dcM ) = p
0
M (m
c
M ) [
c
ML+ 
c
F
c
MF ] =

(1 + )
u0 (ccF ) = u
0 (dcF ) = p
0
F (m
c
F ) [
c
FL+ 
c
F
c
MM ] =

(1 + )
u0 (csM ) = u
0 (dsM ) = 
s
Mp
0
M (m
s
M )L = 
u0 (csF ) = u
0 (dsF ) = 
s
F p
0
F (m
s
F )L = 
Rearranging terms, we obtain rst order conditions (11), (12) (13), (14), (15)
and (16).
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B.2 Decentralisation
The decentralised problem of a couple member is dened by equations (7; 8) for
men and by (9; 10) for women, where we replaced for ci :
u0 (dcM )
u0 (cM )
= (1 +  cM ) (29)
u0 (dcF )
u0
 
ccF
 = (1 +  cF ) (30)
p0 (mcM ) =
u0 (ccM )
cML+ M
c
F
c
MF
(1 + cM ) (31)
p0 (mcF ) =
1
"
u0 (ccF )
cFL+ F
c
M
c
FM
(1 + cF ) (32)
The decentralised problem of a single individual yields the following trade-o¤s:
u0 (dsi )
u0 (csi )
= 1 +  si (33)
p0i (m
s
i ) =
u0 (csi )
siL
(1 + si ) (34)
where i =M;F . Comparing these with (11), (12), (13), (14), (15) and (16), we
obtain (17) to (20) :
B.3 Asymmetric information
The Lagrangian of the second best problem is
$ (ccM ; c
c
F ; d
c
M ; d
c
F ;m
c
M ;m
c
F ; c
s
M ; c
s
F ; d
s
M ; d
s
F ;m
s
M ;m
s
F ) =
= nc (1 + )

UM + 
c
M
c
F bMF + 
c
M
c
F pF (mF )M
+UF ++
c
F
c
MbFM + 
c
F
c
MpM (mM )F

+nsMUM (c
s
M ; d
s
M ;m
s
M ) + n
s
FUF (c
s
F ; d
s
F ;m
s
F )
+

W   nsM fcsM +msM + sMdsMg   nsF fcsF +msF + sFdsF g
 nc fccM +mcM + cMdcM + ccF +mcF + cFdcF g

+M

u (csM ) + 
s
M [pM (m
s
M )u (d
s
M ) + (1  pM (msM )) v (dsM )]
 u (ccM )  sM [pM (mcM )u (dcM ) + (1  pM (mcM )) v (dcM )]

+F

u (csF ) + 
s
F [pF (m
s
F )u (d
s
F ) + (1  pF (msF )) v (dsF )]
 u (ccF )  sF [pF (mcF )u (dcF ) + (1  pF (mcF )) v (dcF )]

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As before, we derive the rst-order conditions,
u0 (csM )

1 +
M
nsM

= 
u0 (csF )

1 +
F
nsF

= 

pM (m
s
M )u
0 (dsM ) + (1  pM (msM )) v0 (dsM )

1 +
M
nsM

= 

pF (m
s
F )u
0 (dsF ) + (1  pF (msF )) v0 (dsF )

1 +
F
nsF

= 
sMp
0
M (m
s
M )L

1 +
M
nsM

= 
sF p
0
F (m
s
F )L

1 +
F
nsF

= 
u0 (ccM )

1 +   M
nc

= 
u0 (ccF )

1 +   F
nc

= 
pM (m
c
M )u
0 (dcM ) + (1  pM (mcM )) v0 (dcM )

1 +   MM
nccM

= 

pF (m
c
F )u
0 (dcF ) + (1  pF (mcF )) v0 (dcF )

1 +   FF
nccF

= 
p0M (m
c
M )

cML

1 +   MM
nccM

+ cF
c
MF (1 + )

= 
p0F (m
c
F )

cFL

1 +   FF
nccF

+ cF
c
MM (1 + )

= 
Using the fact that v (x) = u (x)   L and thus that v0 (x) = u0 (x), we can
rearrange terms so as to obtain the optimal trade-o¤s between present and future
consumptions and between health expenditure and present consumption for each
type of agent, i.e. expressions (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27) and (28).
As for the decentralisation, we equalise expressions (21)  (28) with (29)  
(32), (33) and (34) and obtain the equations for the second-best taxes.
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